

Navy Declassification/Release Instructions on File

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500260001-9

Alternate Speech for Executives Club

Thank you, President Olson. Distinguished head table guests, members of the Executives' Club of Chicago -- it is a great honor to be with you today. As you know, I am a native of Chicagoland, a graduate of Highland Park High School. While moving through the Loop today we passed many familiar landmarks such as the Chicago Athletic Association -- Little did I realize or dream while working out there on Saturday mornings as a boy that my future would include becoming an Admiral or include coming back to the hometown to speak to such a distinguished group such as this. I am happy to be with you today and. Mr. Olson, thanks for making such a Homecoming possible.

Today I would like to take a few minutes to talk about what we are trying to do at the Naval War College and what that effort has to do with the Navy of the future. I will keep my formal comments brief so that we will have time to cover in some detail many of the thought-provoking and challenging questions you have given to me.

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Our objective at the Naval War College is one of developing in these officers a flexibility of mental response to the very imprecise world in which senior decision makers must operate.

3 specific areas - categories decision making that military leaders face today.

First - how to establish objectives

#80B, 3.2m person corporation

4 Divisions - A, N, AF, MC

Corporate objectives not easy

WW II - no trouble

1947 - containment

Today - no monolith

multi-polar

changing national interests

Yet no millenium -

But difficult to be specific

What may need or want military to do
Decisions on capital investment - long term
e.g. Idea for new ship in 1973 - contract
by 1978

Built by 1982

1/2 life by 1995

Equally important if do not make a decision today
Staggers to think of 1995

(Chicago)

1st problem - develop men can deal with uncertain
world of future and make estimates that are
bound to be imprecise but still useful guidance
to day-to-day decision makers

2nd category of decision

How much R&D - 1000 items

How many ship/planes annual replacement cost _____

How many bases - plant value \$ _____

How many people 600,000

Means translating objectives into specifics

How appraoch?

5 packages

Nuc deterrent - \$ _____ B

Sea Control _____

Amphib _____

Tac Air _____

Support

Write paper

Why - how - what circumstances

Alternatives

+ lists

Board of Directors

SOB - SA group

Choices within packages

Choices across packages

Only 1 echelon of decision

DOD

Congress

Seeking - educating

See needs in light of objectives/purposes

Imagination to see alternatives

Judgment to choose midst uncertainty

tempered by what feasible

3rd category - operating decisions

How to bring resources together to operate successfully

Vastly more complex today

Single ship - DLG

AAW

SUW

ASW

Air Control (O'Hare)

Any one difficult

Several at once

Plus coordinated with 9-10 other ships

CVA - SSN

Have computers

Can't abdicate

Even standard solutions doubtful

Nelson "lay alongside"

Lay alongside what

SSN - Torpedo/missile

A/C - Bomb/ missile

Ship - gun/ missile

Mines

Satellite - long range weapon

Opponent more diverse

Alternatives for countering more diverse

- technical

Ability counter a missile may depend
knowledge its characteristics -

Last minute

Finally, can't rely on standard solutions

- political factors

Restrictions on movement, weapons, targets

Must develop decision makers who can deviate -
innovate - and quickly

Conclusion # 1

What doing at NWC developing intellectual
capacity officers

More challenging career than past

Course = graduate education

Want to be ready for directions from
you the public

Means preparing for uncertain

Conclusion # 2

Fabric of whole process is people

AVF. after years reliance on draft

Must make life more attractive

Yet efforts to do so affect our

decisions on Strategy

Management and Tactics

e.g. homeport to reduce time away -

political implications on our strategy

e.g. make ships more comfortable - more expensive

e.g. operate less - less well trained

Difficult task - will do

Not only #s but quality

Technical

Not only #'s but equality - EEO

Demands at NWC

Learn to be international relations expert

Learn to be systems analyst

Learn to be tactician

Learn to be sociologist

CHICAGO EXECUTIVES CLUB

29 March 1973

Thank you, President Olson, Distinguished head table guests, members of the Executives' Club. As a native Chicagoan, I find it a treat to be back in our wonderful city. While moving through the loop this morning, I passed many familiar landmarks such as the Chicago Athletic Association. Little did I realize or dream while working out there on Saturday mornings as a boy that my future would include becoming an Admiral or include coming back to the hometown to speak to such a distinguished group such as this. I have enjoyed being on your side of this rostrum many times as my father's guest, I am honored to be on this side of it today.

I would like to take a few minutes to talk about what we are attempting to accomplish at the United States Naval War College today and what effect that effort may have on the Navy of the future. I will keep my formal comments brief. I look forward to addressing as many of your thought-provoking questions as possible.

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services, the State Department, the Coast Guard and the CIA. These men are destined for top leadership positions. They come to the Naval War College in Newport RI from what I call a Newtonian Universe, a universe of rational explanations for almost all phenonena. These men's vocational experience and much of their training and education have been in a technical world where right and wrong answers must exist and also in an authoritarian world where military decisions should be correct not incorrect, precise not vague.

Our objective at the Naval War College is to develop in these officers a concept of thinking about three very imprecise subjects with which all senior decision makers must grapple. The first subject is strategy. This involves the uncertain world of broad questions such as "How does the United States adapt from the bi-polar world of just the U.S. and Soviet Union of the 1950's and 60's to the multi-polar environment of the US, SOviets, European Community, China and Japan, of the 1970's and 80's?" The second subject that we cover is the inexact world of management where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier or do we buy two or three

smaller carriers each with limited capabilities?" Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of tactical decisions. Tactics which today is done amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly that standard doctrines are almost always outdated. Compounding the complexities in all of these cases, we deal with very imprecise objectives and at the same time are confronted with uncertainty by not having a standard of measure such as most of you gentlemen enjoy in the profit and loss statement! (At least I hope that most of you are enjoying yours.)

When I say that we do not have a very precise objective for our \$80B corporation in the DOD, I mean we cannot establish precise basic objectives due to the very nature of our business.

1) Why do we want a military? 2) How do you translate National Goals into Military missions? 3) What interplay should there be between the State Department and DOD? 4) Where and when might we employ military force? These questions regarding objectives are less amenable to clarification than is when I stress the impreciseness of our Business corporation or company best out of satisfy a consumer's need. Secondly, we also have difficulty in measuring performance. How well did the Navy satisfy its customers - you the public last year? Compared with the Army? Now in the business world you fortunately have many good measures such as Sales, Profit as % of Sales, Turnover, return on Assets, return on stockholders investment. We lack such tools.

There is then a great need for military men who can approach complex problems such as establishing military objectives and measuring the degree of fulfillment without waiting for the test of war. To do these things we need men who are not only skilled craftsmen at the relatively exact arts of driving ships and aircraft, but men who are architects of inexact policies of vast national and international import.

The task that these officers face in 1973 is compounded by the fact that the very foundation on which we have based our military objectives since World War II has disappeared. George Kennan's policy of containment has gone the way of monolithic communism. We can no longer justify military force on the grounds that they are intended to back communism wherever it may try to exude.

We have been accustomed to measuring our objectives in terms of readiness for military action anywhere along the Soviet-Chinese periphery. We have been accustomed to measuring our success in terms of how well our foreign policy, backed by military preparedness, held the line. Interestingly, the only geographical extension of communism since 1949 was not an extension of perimeter, but a leap from across the seas to Cuba.

With containment gone we must now redefine our objectives and our measures of success. This is our new task.

at the Naval War College we insist on taking the students back to the two fundamental reasons for military power - first to provide a deterrent force in peacetime and second to provide insurance in case that deterrence fails.

Today, though, there are some who avow that our need for military insurance has diminished if not disappeared. This is understandable, just as understandable as when a man who has just paid for a new sprinkler system in his factory asks whether he can reduce his fire insurance premiums. Detente appears to be approaching; in turn military preparedness appears to be less critical.

There are also those who contend that it is not in our interests today to use the presence of military forces in support of foreign policy. They point out that our domestic needs are too urgent to afford this capability or that sabre

rattling is too risky.

One could argue each of these points interminably. The debate, though, would not be between the extremes of no insurance or no presence capability on one hand and overwhelming superiority over all potential opponents on the other. The debate would be around some point in between, some point where it appears acceptable for this country to set its defenses. I think that we can Bracket that point.

I would start down from side of very large insurance by working from the assumption that one acceptable point between the extremes would be our honoring our NATO commitments if Western Europe were assaulted. Most people in this country I believe, agree that our vital interests lie in preventing Western Europe from falling into the orbit of the Soviet Union. How much military power we require to prevent this, and of what kind, is a matter for considerable debate.

Now nearer to the other extreme of no capability to intervene overseas must recognize that most people today would agree that we want to avoid another prolonged, ambiguous ground war in Asia. National consensus on our need for military forces then, must lie at some point in between support for NATO and aversion to more Vietnams. The spectrum covers a vast scope of insurance against potential conflicts and possible ways to employ military force for diplomatic purpose. Even with

the best men using their judgement and the analytic techniques we have. There is no way of identifying this point explicitly. It is a matter of weighing national priorities.

We must weigh those priorities in the light of the changes in both the world environment and in domestic attitudes. On the international scene this means recognizing the impact of our emergence from the bi-polar world into a multi-polar one.

At the War College we start our students with the study of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars, of the 5th Century B.C. This was an era of a bi-polar focus. We point out that bi-polar periods have been aberrations in history. More often there have been a number of powers to balance against each other. Balance of power, means just that. You must have power to be a player in the game. Power, though, is not limited to military force. National power is comprised of industrial strength, national will, moral stature, organizational ability and other elements in addition to military strength. The issue for military students, is to probe for that type of military force which the country needs to complement our other sources of power. If a prime purpose of having military forces in the 1970's is to balance, or, to provide negotiating pressure,

rather than to contain by military action as in Korea and Vietnam, the construction of those forces may be different.

It requires sophistication for a military man to think in terms of influencing in addition to fighting & to think in terms of winning in more ways than battlefield victory and to think in terms of understanding how other people's perceptions of our military might can influence their diplomatic decisions.

In other words, a world of multi-power negotiations requires a military posture that has virtues other than simply being capable of defeating the next fellow's. In fact, in an era of negotiations you may achieve your military purpose or fail to do so without directly engaging the enemy, or perhaps by doing combat with only a fraction of his force in a quick engagement that is hastily terminated. I suggest that today's environment will require us when constructing military programs to pay more attention than has before to the interdependence of military with political and diplomatic forces.

What our political needs are, though, is something that we in uniform can not and should not determine. That is where the changes in domestic attitudes must come into consideration. We in military uniform are servants to you, the public.

Our, role is to be prepared to comprehend and to follow whatever course the nation selects and to do so with purpose,

dedication, and proficiency. We also must advise the degree to which our forces are capable of supporting the national objectives or strategy. The purpose of having a War College today is to intellectually prepare the next crop of Naval leaders to do this - to understand the society that they serve, and to deal intelligently with the imprecise, uncertain and subjective character of the national will.

There is no simple way for the public to express that will under our democratic process. It must, of course, be largely through the Congress and the President, but I submit that this requires from the public a positive approach to complexity of the task. Nothing could be more extravagant. would be for us to back into an evaluation of military needs through disinterest in the military or through dismay at the magnitude of the task. Nothing could be more extravagant. We could well end up with the military preparing for a set of objectives that might be 180° out from an unexpressed public opinion. In the era of the All Volunteer Force, you the public must assume a greater responsibility for providing direction to the military establishment. The end of the draft must not mean the end of your concern for and interest in your armed forces. In short, giving a sense

of positive direction to military purpose is an essential element of ensuring that such force is both tailored and employed only as the national will dictates.

We are striving, through higher military education today, to be ready to work with you, in locating the consensus on military purpose that we require as our guidance. The task demands higher and more flexible intellectual capabilities in military men than ever before. The risks in making errors or in inadequate preparation are severe in this technical age of swift and treacherous weaponry and of intricate balancing of international forces. We are dedicated in higher military education to ensuring that your military leaders of tomorrow are sensitive to your directions and worthy of your relying on them for whatever purposes you select.

MASTER

Thank you, President Olson, Distinguished head table guests, members of the Executives' Club. ^{opportunity} As a native Chicagoan, ^{High School} I find it a treat to be back in our wonderful city. While moving through the loop this morning, I passed many familiar landmarks such as the Chicago Athletic Association. Little did I realize or dream while working out there on Saturday mornings as a boy that my future would include becoming an Admiral or include coming back to the hometown to speak to such a distinguished group such as this. I have enjoyed being on your side of this rostrum many times as my father's guest. I am honored to be on this side of it today.

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case deterrence fails. I purposely omit the
aggressive use of military force as an instrument of policy,
even though some of our critics, domestic and foreign, would
not be so generous. I simply do not believe that either our
military or political leaders would deliberately promote war
as a means of achieving national objectives. We may
unwillingly or unwillingly be boxed into a war, but not by
design.

Today, though, there are some who avow that our need
for military insurance has diminished if not disappeared.
This is understandable, just as understandable as it is
for a man who has just paid for a new sprinkler system in his
factory to ask whether he can reduce his fire insurance premiums.
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rather than to contain by military action ^{as} in Korea and Vietnam, the construction of those forces may be different. It requires sophistication for a military man to think in terms of influencing in addition to fighting ^{to think} in terms of winning in more ways than battlefield victory ^{to think} especially in terms of understanding how other people's perceptions of our military might can influence their diplomatic decisions.

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There is no simple way for the public to express that
will / under our democratic process. / It must, of course, be *done*
through the Congress / and the President, / I submit ~~though~~,
that this requires from the public / a positive approach to
military matters. / The most dangerous course I can imagine /
would be for us to back into an evaluation of military needs /
through disinterest in the military / or through dismay at the
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#80B, 3.2m person corporation

4 Divisions - A, N, AF, MC

Corporate objectives not easy

WW II - no trouble

1947 - containment

Today - no monolith

multi-polar

changing national interests

disarmament

Yet no millenium -

But difficult to be specific

What may need or want military to do

Decisions on capital investment - long term

e.g. Idea for new ship in 1973 - contract
by 1978

Built by 1982

1/2 life by 1995

Equally important if do not make a decision today

Staggers to think of 1995

(Chicago)

1st problem - develop men can deal with uncertain
world of future and make estimates that are
bound to be imprecise but still useful guidance
to day-to-day decision makers

2nd category of decision

How much R&D - 1000 items

How many ship/planes annual replacement cost _____

How many bases - plant value \$ 16 B 400 M

How many people 600,000

Means translating objectives into specifics

How approach?

5 packages

Nuc deterrent - \$ _____ B

Sea Control _____

Amphib _____

Tac Air _____

TOTAL CAPITAL
INVESTMENT

SHIPS/
VARD CRAFT 36 B

A/C 14 B

BASES 16.9 B

\$ 66,251,379,000

Support

Write paper

Why - how - what circumstances

Alternatives

+ lists

-

Board of Directors

SOB - SA group

Choices within packages

Choices across packages

Only 1 echelon of decision

DOD

Congress

Seeking - educating

See needs in light of objectives/purposes

Imagination to see alternatives

Judgment to choose midst uncertainty

tempered by what feasible

3rd category - operating decisions

How to bring resources together to operate success-
fully

Vastly more complex today

Single ship - DLG

AAW

SUW

ASW

Air Control (O'Hare)

Any one difficult

Several at once

Plus coordinated with 9-10 other ships

CVA - SSN

Have computers

Can't abdicate

Even standard solutions doubtful

Nelson "lay alongside"

Lay alongside what

SSN - Torpedo/missile

A/C - Bomb/ missile

Ship - gun/ missile

Mines

Satellite - long range weapon

Opponent more diverse

Alternatives for countering more diverse

- technical

Ability counter a missile may depend

knowledge its characteristics -

Last minute

Finally, can't rely on standard solutions

- political factors

- Restrictions on movement, weapons, targets

Must develop decision makers who can deviate -
innovate - and quickly

Conclusion # 1

What doing at NWC developing intellectual
capacity officers

- More challenging career than past

- Course = graduate education

- Want to be ready for directions from
you the public

- Means preparing for uncertain

Conclusion # 2

Fabric of whole process is people

- AVF. after years reliance on draft

- Must make life more attractive

Yet efforts to do so affect our

- decisions on Strategy

- Management and Tactics

- e.g. homeport to reduce time away -

- political implications on our strategy

- e.g. make ships more comfortable - more expensive

e.g. operate less - less well trained

Difficult task - will do

Not only #s but quality

Technical

Not only #'s but equality - EEO

Demands at NWC

Learn to be international relations expert

Learn to be systems analyst

Learn to be tactician

Learn to be sociologist

EXECUTIVES' CLUB *News*

Volume 49, No. 20

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602

April 6, 1973

Admiral Turner Tells Quality of Men Needed to Meet Problems of Military Objectives



DESCRIBES NAVY PERSONNEL OF TOMORROW

Welcoming the President of the Naval War College were (L-R) Rear Admiral Alban Weber, USN-R, Executive Director, Federation of Independent Illinois Colleges and Universities; Waldo D. Thorson, Insurance Broker; Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, Guest Speaker; John B. Loveland, Presiding Officer, Director of The Club and Rear Admiral Draper L. Kauffman, USN, Commandant, Ninth Naval District, Great Lakes.

CHAIRMAN LOVELAND: Good afternoon, gentlemen.

I am John Loveland, Director of The Club. I am taking over for Bill Olson, who is out of town today.

Our guest speaker has kindly consented to answer questions following his talk as time allows.

At a time when the last of the American prisoners are finally enroute home and the nation is stirred by the comments of brave men, it is particularly appropriate that we have as our guest the President of the Naval War College.

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner studied at Amherst, Annapolis, Harvard, and Oxford. At the time of his graduation from Annapo-

lis he was the Commander of the Brigade of Midshipmen.

At the Harvard Business School, he attended the advanced management program, and at Oxford he studied philosophy, political science, and economics prior to receiving his Master's Degree.

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner said what we need are not only skilled craftsmen at driving ships and airplanes, but men who are also capable of being architects of imprecise policies of vast import to our national and international position.

Our guest has commanded destroyers, ocean mine sweepers, guided missile frigates, and a carrier task force group.

He has served in both the Atlantic and Pacific, and received decorations in both the Korean and Vietnam combat theatres. Admiral Turner has been awarded the Navy Commendation Medal, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Legion of Merit.

Throughout his life, this native of Highland Park has been a brilliant achiever. In addition to his sea commands, Admiral Turner has served in the Political-Military Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and on the Staff of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. He was a Systems Analyst in the Secretary of Defense Office, and also the Executive Assistant and Naval Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.

We are proud of our fighting men and honored to have the youngest Flag Officer and only Rhodes Scholar ever to assume the Presidency of the Navy's Senior Graduate Level College.

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May I present Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, United States Navy. (Applause)

ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you, Chairman Loveland; Distinguished Guests at the headtable; Members of The Executives' Club; Representatives of Chicago High Schools.

My task as President of *your* Navy's senior educational institution is a particularly interesting one today. I am involved in directing the mid-career education of 450 hand-picked officers and career civilians from all of our military services, the State Department, the Coast Guard and the CIA. These men are destined for top leadership positions. They come to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. from what I call a Newtonian Universe, a universe of *rational* explanations for almost all phenomena. These men's vocational experience and much of their training and education have been in a technical world where right and wrong answers *must* exist and also in an authoritarian world where military decisions should be correct, not incorrect, precise not vague.

Clarifies Objectives

Our objective at the Naval War College is to develop in these officers a concept of thinking about three very imprecise subjects with which all senior decision-makers must grapple. The first subject is *strategy*. This involves the uncertain world of broad questions such as "How does the United States adapt from the bi-polar world of just the U.S. and Soviet Union of the 1950's and 60's to the multi-polar environment of the U.S., Soviets, European community, China and Japan, of the 1970's and 80's?"

The second subject that we cover is the *inexact* world of *management* where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier or do we buy two or three smaller carriers each with limited capabilities?"

Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of *tactical* decisions. Tactics which today is done amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly that standard doctrines are almost always outdated. Compounding the complexities in all of these cases, we deal with very imprecise objectives and at the same time are confronted with uncertainty by not having a standard of measure such as most of you gentlemen enjoy in the profit and loss statement! (At least I hope that most of you are enjoying yours.)

When I say that we do not have a very precise objective for our 80 billion dollar corporation in the Defense Department, I mean we cannot establish precise *basic* objectives due to the very nature of our business. 1) Why do we want a military? 2) How do you translate national goals into military missions? 3) What interplay should there be between the State Department and

DOD? 4) Where and when might we employ military force? These questions regarding objectives are less amenable to clarification than is when I stress the impreciseness of our Business corporation or company best out to satisfy a consumer's need. Secondly, we also have difficulty in measuring performance. How well did the Navy satisfy its customers—you, the public, last year? Compared with the Army?

Now, in the business world you fortunately have many good measures such as sales, profit as % of sales, turnover, return on assets, return on stockholders investment. We lack such tools.

There is then a great need for military men who can approach complex problems such as establishing military objectives and measuring the degree of fulfillment without waiting for the test of war. To do these things we need men who are not only skilled craftsmen at the relatively exact arts of driving ships and aircraft, but men who are architects of inexact policies of vast national and international import.

The task that these officers face in 1973 is compounded by the fact that the very foundation on which we have based our military objectives since World War II has disappeared. George Kennan's policy of *containment* has gone the way of monolithic communism. We can no longer justify military force or push the grounds that they are intended to back communism wherever it may try to exude.

We have been accustomed to measuring our objectives in terms of readiness for military action anywhere along the Soviet-Chinese periphery. We have been accustomed to measuring our success in terms of how well our foreign policy, backed by military preparedness, held the line. Interestingly, the only geographical extension of communism since 1949 was not an extension of perimeter, but a leap from across the seas to Cuba.

With containment gone we must now redefine our objectives and our measures of success. Thus, in our course at the Naval War College, we insist on taking the students back to the two fundamental reasons for military power—first to provide a deterrent force in peacetime and second to provide insurance in case that deterrence fails.

Today, though, there are some who avow that our need for military *insurance* has diminished, if not disappeared. This is understandable, just as understandable as when a man who has just paid for a new sprinkler system in his factory asks whether he can reduce his fire *insurance* premiums. Deterrence appears to be approaching; in turn military preparedness appears to be less critical.

There are also those who contend that it is *not* in our interests today to use the pres-

ence of military forces in support of foreign policy. They point out that our domestic needs are too urgent to afford this capability or that sabre rattling is too risky.

One could argue each of these points interminably. The debate, though, would not be between the extremes of *no* insurance or *no* presence capability on one hand and overwhelming superiority over all potential opponents on the other. The debate would be around some point in between, some point where it appears acceptable for this country to set its defenses. I think that we can bracket that point.

I would start down from the side of very large insurance by working from the assumption that one acceptable point between the extremes would be our honoring our NATO commitments if Western Europe were assaulted. Most people in this country I believe, agree that our vital interests lie in preventing Western Europe from falling into the orbit of the Soviet Union. How much military power we require to prevent this, and of what kind, is a matter for considerable debate.

Defines Balance of Power

Now nearer to the other extreme of no capability to intervene overseas must recognize that most people today would agree that we want to avoid another prolonged, ambiguous ground war in Asia. National consensus on our need for military forces then, must lie at some point in between support for NATO and aversion to more Vietnams. The spectrum covers a vast scope of insurance against potential conflicts and possible ways to employ military force for diplomatic purpose. Even with the best men using their judgement and the best analytic technicians we have, There is no way of identifying this point explicitly. It is a matter of weighing national priorities.

We must weigh those priorities in the light of the changes in both the world en-

vironment and in domestic attitudes. On the international scene this means recognizing the impact of our emergence from the bi-polar world into a multi-polar one.

At the War College we start our students with the study of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*, of the 5th Century B.C. This was an era of a bi-polar focus. We point out that bi-polar periods have been aberrations in history. More often there have been a number of powers to balance against each other.

Balance of power, means just that. You must *have* power to be a player in the game. Power, though, is not limited to military force. National power is comprised of industrial strength, national will, moral stature, organizational ability and other elements in addition to military strength.

The issue for military students, is to probe for that type of military force which the country needs to complement our *other* sources of power. If a prime purpose of having military forces in the 1970's is to balance, or, to provide negotiating pressure, rather than to contain by military action as in Korea and Vietnam, the construction of those forces may be different. It requires sophistication for a *military* man to think in terms of winning in more ways than battlefield victory and to think in terms of understanding how other people's *perceptions* of our military might can influence their diplomatic decisions.

In other words, a world of multi-power negotiations requires a military posture that has virtues other than simply being capable of defeating the next fellow's. In fact, in a era of negotiations you may achieve your military purpose or fail to do so without directly engaging the enemy, or perhaps by engaging in combat with only a fraction of his force in a quick engagement that is hastily terminated. I suggest that today's environment will require us when constructing military programs to pay more attention

than has before to the interdependence of military with political and diplomatic forces.

What our political needs are, though, is something that we in uniform *cannot* and *should* not determine. That is where the changes in domestic attitudes must come into consideration. We in military uniform are servants to you, the public.

Our role is to be prepared to comprehend and to *follow* whatever course the nation selects and to do so with purpose, dedication, and proficiency.

Cites Purpose of War College

The purpose of having a War College today is to intellectually prepare the next crop of Naval leaders to do this—to understand the society that they serve, and to deal intelligently with the imprecise, uncertain and subjective character of the national will.

There is no simple way for the public to express that will under our democratic process. It must, of course, be largely through the Congress and the President, but I submit that this requires from the public a positive approach to the military matters.

It would be most dangerous for us to back into an evaluation of military needs through disinterest in the military or through dismay at the magnitude of the task. Nothing could be more extravagant. We could well end up with the military preparing for a set of objectives that might be 180° out from an unexpressed public opinion.

In the era of the All Volunteer Force, you, the public, must assume a greater responsibility for providing direction to the military establishment. The end of the draft must not mean the end of your concern for an interest in your armed forces.

In short, giving a sense of positive direction to military purpose is an essential element of ensuring that such force is both tailored and employed only as the national will dictates.



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
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Thank you. (Applause)

CHAIRMAN LOVELAND: Thank you, Admiral.

Those of you who have to leave, do so as quietly as possible.

Admiral, do you see any problem in the military services gaining adequate personnel on a voluntary basis?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I am happy to report that I do not see any problem.

We have had problems in the past. A year ago, our recruiting was below quotas. In the last six months, it has been above.

This is in part because the Congress has been generous in granting pay raises.

It is in part because the Congress has allowed us to advertise.

It is in part because Admiral Zumwalt, in our case, has done many things to make the Navy a more attractive place.

It is in part because we have intensified and improved our recruiting efforts.

But we are, happily, meeting our quotas today and expect to do so into the indefinite future.

All of the services are bending every effort that they can to make the nation's mandate of an all-volunteer force, on the one hand, and 2.4 million men in uniform on the other, a reality.

We are confident that we can do it. We need your help in insuring that the youth of this country understand and recognize that a military profession is an honorable and an important one.

CHAIRMAN LOVELAND: What does current naval appropriations mean to the future of the Navy, *vis-a-vis* the Russian Navy and a possible expanding Chinese Navy?

ADMIRAL TURNER: In the last three years, Congress has reduced the request from

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
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the entire Department of Defense by one, three and five billion dollars respectively.

I must say that we feel we are now on a rockhard budget. We feel that if this trend continues, and if the Soviet Navy trend continues in the opposite direction, we will be in trouble in the not-too-distant future.

As for the Chinese Navy, I understand it now has 40 modern, conventional submarines and a force of more than 150,000 officers and men. It must be a factor to be considered. While most of China's Navy is suited for short-range operations there's no question that a modern naval force, big or small, can make quite an impression on the international scene.

CHAIRMAN LOVELAND: Please comment on the cost and the vulnerability of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. (Laughter)

Guests and members seated at the Speaker's Table Thursday, March 29, 1973, to hear Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN were (top left to right) Duane T. Malthop, Holmes A. Loudon, Marshall W. Reavis III, Elroy C. Sandquist, Jr., John W. Garrett, Richard B. Finn, Arnold R. Schenk, Rear Admiral Draper L. Kauffman, USN, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN and John B. Loveland, Presiding Officer (Director of The Club). Shown below (left to right) Samuel Wm. Sax, Vice Admiral R. F. Whitehead, USN (Ret.), Rear Admiral Alban Weber, USN-R, Charles A. Kelly, J. Channon Bowes, Charles F. Kennedy, John R. Farquharson, Lawrence J. Dell, John C. Williams, John J. Zeisler and Isidore Brown.

ADMIRAL TURNER: Today we have three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers—one in being; one about to be commissioned; and one under construction. The fourth one, for which we have received advance appropriations of \$300 million and for which we are now requesting the balance, is a very special one.

With the fourth carrier we will have two quick-reaction, nuclear-powered fire brigades on each coast of the United States ready to go


to any trouble spot on short notice, and without any major logistics problem.

Were we not to complete the fourth carrier because of a change in direction of thinking we would lose the \$300 million. Furthermore, we would lose many valuable years in design and recontracting. As it is, this carrier will not be in the fleet until 1981. What's more, by that time we will face a block obsolescence problem because all of our Forrestal (there are eight of them) carriers will then be over 30 years of age.

We believe that to maintain control of the seas, we must maintain a schedule of orderly replacement of the aircraft carriers. If there are any skeptics in this country who oppose the concept, I refer them to Admiral Gorshkov, the Soviet Navy head, who has recently gone into the aircraft carrier business himself.

CHAIRMAN LOVELAND: Admiral, have any women made application to the College? (Laughter)

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, we have had women students at the Naval War College for many years, and we have several in class now. We have a Lieutenant Commander woman officer who is a member of our fac-



ulty and who is teaching Thucydides, Bismarck and other similar subjects to the hardnose Colonels and Captains we have there. (Laughter)

CHAIRMAN LOVELAND: How has the curriculum changed in the recent years?

ADMIRAL TURNER: This last year we made a major revision in the curriculum in the Naval War College. I believe we have reached the point where too many subjects have been added to the curriculum. Over the years, and particularly since the end of World War II, the military has become involved in many facets of the economy and society. We have attempted to keep pace with these developments by adding them to the curriculum piece-by-piece. As a result, the program got too thinned out.

For instance, 15 years ago few people in the Navy had ever heard of the balance of payments problem.

A few years ago we were not actively engaged in ecology, environmental protection and so on.

Therefore, we decided it was time to call a halt and acknowledge we cannot teach everything of relevance to the students in a 10-month period. So, we shifted the emphasis to the thinking process—the process of thinking out, for example, a strategy problem. As I indicated earlier in the speech, we are doing this from a basis of history because we think the students can draw lessons, analogies, from history—not that history is going to repeat itself—but rather that the student will better understand the process of history and the impact decision making has had on it.

We are not concerned that the students learn all the latest about today's strategy because by the time they apply it the current policies will have changed. We want them to attack tomorrow's strategy with the same thinking, analytical process they have learned at the Naval War College.

Similarly, the emphasis on management is not on what is the problem of the billion-dollar carrier, the F-14 or the LHA. Rather, the emphasis is on how do you determine alternatives; how do you examine them; how do you make a decision between them; and, having done that, carry it out. That is not an easy task.

In Tactics we are not teaching the students about today's tactics. We are teaching them how do you derive a tactic so if tomorrow an entirely new weapon appears on the scene these men will be capable of dealing with it.

GUESTS AND MEMBERS SEATED AT THE SPEAKER'S TABLE MARCH 29, 1973

Duane T. Molthrop, *Chairman of the Board, Viceroy Steel Works.*
Holmes A. Loudon, *Sales Representative, Hobart-McIntosh Paper Company.*
Marshall W. Reavis III, *Professor, Business Administration and Collegial Co-ordinator of Co-operative Education, Governors State University (President, Chicago Council of the Navy League).*
Elroy C. Sandquist, Jr., *Partner, Peterson, Ross, Rall, Barber & Seidel.*
John W. Garrett, (Ret.) *Secretary-Treasurer, John R. Thompson Company.*
Richard B. Finn, *Senior Partner, Finn, Van Mell & Penney.*
Arnold R. Schenk, *Director of Program, Chicago Area Council, Boy Scouts of America.*
Rear Admiral Draper L. Kauffman, *USN, Commandant, Ninth Naval District.*
Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, *USN, President, Naval War College (Guest Speaker).*
John B. Loveland, *President, Associated Security Planners, Inc., Presiding Officer (Director of The Club).*

Samuel Wm. Sax, *President & Chief Executive Officer, Exchange National Bank of Chicago (Member, Executive Committee of The Club).*
Vice Admiral R. F. Whitehead, *USN (Ret.), Director, Katy Industries, Inc. (Director of The Club).*
Rear Admiral Alban Weber, *USN-R, Executive Director, Federation of Independent Illinois Colleges and Universities.*
Charles A. Kelly, *Partner, Hubacheck, Kelly, Rauch & Kirby.*
J. Cannon Bowes, *Vice President, The W. W. Rice Company.*
Charles E. Kennedy, *Executive Vice President, First National Bank of La Grange.*
John R. Farquharson, *President, Midwest Area, ARA Food Services Company.*
Lawrence J. Dell, *Assistant Vice President, First of Michigan Corporation.*
John C. Williams, *Partner, Sidley & Austin.*
John J. Zeisler, *Sales Manager, E. F. Hutton & Company.*
Isidore Brown, *Senior Member, Brown, Dashow, Langelutrig, Arons & Doran.*

You have me on my favorite subject. I may not stop. (Laughter)

The second thing we have done, which I think reflects the tone of the talk I just gave, is that we have really turned the pressure on and made the Naval War College a full-scale, graduate level academic institution. For example, in Strategy the students read 1,000 pages a week. They must write an essay every three weeks, and, a great heresy for which I am hardly popular for on campus, they must take a written examination every four weeks.

The students in the senior course average 41 years of age, those in the junior course average 33. Many of them have been in the cockpit, on the bridge, and it has been 12-15 years since they left college. Taking examinations, and doing the other work required of them, is not an easy assignment.

But, I believe our profession is competitive—intensely competitive—and we demand people who are going to be able to master the intensely complex problems that face us. We can do nothing less than give them a full challenge in the few months we have to prepare them for the top jobs. (Applause)

CHAIRMAN LOVELAND: How have you solved the race problem?

ADMIRAL TURNER: The Navy is working hard on the race problem.

The Navy is conducting intensive race relations seminars and training sessions. About two months ago I was ordered to Norfolk, Va. There I sat for two days with eight other Admirals and eight members of the minority groups running from seamen to lieutenants.

I averaged about six hours of sleep. We sat and rapped for two days, each letting our hair down and telling one another how we felt about the racial problem.

It was a most exhilarating experience and the end result, in any view, is going to be that many of us who have not been racists in our practice in the Navy, but who have not paid attention to whether others around us were doing things that either were discriminatory, or appeared to be discriminatory, will be more alert to that in the future.

Also, we are now bringing into the Navy the appropriate number of minority groups. Yet, for some time to come, we will have a problem of perceived racial bias. Unfortunately, the Navy has been behind the power curve in minority recruiting. While we have a larger number of minority Navymen in the lower grades it does take a while to move them along to middle and top management. However, right now the man at the bottom can only look up the line and see too few of the minority groups. To him it appears to be bias.

It is unfortunate because it is a preceudural bias and we are trying our best to move these people up, appropriately, as they are qualified. Be assured, however, that the full structure of the Navy is dedicated to equal opportunity and I am confident we are well on our way to success. (Applause)

CHAIRMAN LOVELAND: Here's a dandy!

What lessons have been learned as the result of the Vietnam War?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, in 30 minutes—(laughter)—I will mention two or

three lessons from a naval point of view. I am not qualified to talk about ground operations.

The foremost lesson we had reiterated is the continued usefulness of the attack aircraft carrier. Our carriers arrive in Vietnamese waters in the early days of the war before land bases were completed and they carried a major share of the combat load.

The same happened in the closing days, as we were withdrawing.

As you probably know, that last April during the massive invasion of South Vietnam we doubled our aircraft carrier strength and all other supporting ships in the Tonkin Gulf. We were able to fulfill our assignments in those critical days which brought the war to an end.

A second lesson was the importance and versatility of naval gunfire support. Sometimes we tend to neglect the importance of the old-fashioned guns on the ships. The Marine Corps and the Army will gladly testify to the value of the gunfire support ships. The ground troops really appreciated the help they got.

They found, for instance when Quang Tri was under siege, that gunfire support could be counted on day and night with its regular deadly accuracy. Such support near the front lines is a significant plus factor for the troops.

Thirdly, I think we all appreciate more than ever before the importance of maintaining flexible, multi-purpose forces. We don't want to get ourselves locked into the belief that we know in advance just what type of war we can expect to encounter in the future.

We had to be innovative and flexible in Vietnam, pre-conceived and traditional patterns went out the window. However, I know we are all thinking more flexible today—thinking more about the kinds of naval forces that can be used in other Vietnam-type wars, how we will be able to fight in support of NATO and to plan ahead for the totally unexpected. We must be ready to meet any contingency.

CHAIRMAN LOVELAND: I am going to wrap this last question up all in one. There are several questions but they are all basically on the same subject.

The first is, do the Russians have submarines operating off our coasts?

The second is, what are the United States and Russian ships doing in the Mediterranean Sea?

The third is, with Russia building her Navy, how soon before she will have supremacy of the sea?

And the last—With Congress continuing to cut the armed services budget, won't we

High School Students Attending Luncheon, March 29, 1973

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John Carthon	Farragut
Willie Walls	Dunbar Vocational
Joel Peters	Gage Park
Frederick Wysocki	Harper
Larry Watkins	King
Albert Kieser	Tilden

be in a position where our shores will no longer be adequately protected?

I am going to wrap these all up and turn them over to the Admiral.

ADMIRAL TURNER: I will need them, there are so many. (Laughter) Where do we start, John?

Do the Russians have submarines off our coasts?

That is easy. Yes, the Russians maintain continuous patrols of ballistic missile submarines off both the coasts of the United States today. This is part of their strategic nuclear forces.

These forces, ours and theirs, are now controlled under the SALT Agreement. They are permitted to have 62 ballistic missile submarines with 950 submarine launched ballistic missiles. We have, under the Agreement, 44 submarines and 710 missiles.

What are the U.S. and Russian ships doing in the Mediterranean?

The United States SIXTH Fleet has been in the Mediterranean ever since the Truman Doctrine was enunciated, and it has been there largely to provide military and political influence and support similar to that I mentioned in my speech. The fleet is there to support our allies (the Greeks and the Turks) on the far exposed flank of NATO.

And, of course, we have interests that are becoming even more vital in the Middle East. Three weeks ago I had the privilege of discussing the Middle East oil situation with Sam Sax, and I think we agree there is no doubt the U.S. is going to have to rely on increased imports of oil from overseas. The question is how much?

We may be able to reduce the requirement for oil by belt-tightening here at home, but we are going to be importing more. That will aggravate our balance of payments problem. We will have to export more. It would be unwise and short-sighted for a nation such as ours to be so dependent on the seas without having the visible capacity and visible capability to defend our interests around

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**Friday, April 27, 1973
Grand Ballroom, PALMER HOUSE**



the world. That's the type of mission our SIXTH Fleet performs in the Mediterranean.

At the same time, the Russian Navy has grown from nothing 10 years ago to a very formidable force. I was a Task Group Commander there about two years ago and it's my belief we are still the top dog. We are the top dog because we have the attack carriers and the Russians do not.

The fact the Russians have put so much emphasis on the Mediterranean area indicates the importance of that area of the world to them. It also indicates they have clearly recognized the political, military, and diplomatic use of military forces that I mentioned earlier. There is no question that Russia is on her way to becoming a major seapower.

With Russia building her Navy, how long before she will have supremacy?

I stated earlier that if the current trend continues—our Navy decreasing in size and quality because of reduced appropriations—while the Soviets move forward—we are going to have serious problems.

We have made substantial cuts in the Navy during the last five years. More than 45 per cent of our ships, 20 per cent of our airplanes, and 15 per cent of our people.

What we have done, though, is mortgage the future of the Navy. We have taken those cuts in present capability in order to put that money into construction of new, modernized naval forces for the future.

If Congress continues to cut the armed forces budget, won't it put us in a position where our shores won't be adequately protected?

This matter relates to what I have just discussed. However, I think we not only have to protect our immediates but we must present a visible capability to defend our world-wide requirements also. The two go hand-in-hand. One without the other would be pointless.

For instance, we import 69 of the 72 strategic raw materials needed for industry in the United States. In another decade we will be importing more than 50 per cent of our oil. I should point out that we don't expect to have to fight to defend the sea lines. Rather, by having the capability and making it visible, we will cut off any challenge in that arena before it could take shape.

Thank you very much for the opportunity of being with you today. (Applause)

CHAIRMAN LOVELAND: Thank you very much, Admiral Turner.

We are adjourned.

April 2, 1973

Mr. Arthur Stewart
Executive Secretary
Executives' Club of Chicago
111 West Washington St.
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Mr. Stewart:

As the representative of the Christian Fenger High School to the Executives' Club luncheon on February 23, 1973, I would like to express my profound appreciation for one of the most enjoyable afternoons of my high school years.

I was greatly impressed by the guest speaker of the afternoon, the Honorable Rolf T. Pauls, German Ambassador to the United States. Conversing with several members of the club regarding their particular field was an experience which I will always remember.

I extend to you, and the entire Executive Club body, a very personal thank-you for a truly rewarding afternoon.

Sincerely,

Lester E. Pryor
Christian Fenger High School